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HARRY POTTER, SCIENTOLOGY, AND THE MYSTERIOUS
REALM OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: ANALYZING
WHEN CLOSE IS TOO CLOSE AND WHEN THE USE IS FAIR
Rosalinde Casalini*
After going to a theatre and watching a new movie, would it
be possible to go home and write a book about it? What about after
reading a novel? Would a reader be free to write a new book using
the same characters? Would a teacher be able to write her own train-
ing manual using the exact techniques she had just learned in another
author's book? Is there any recourse for authors facing these types of
situations? This Comment explores how two lower courts have re-
cently addressed these questions. The first decision, Warner Bros.
Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books,' determined whether an unautho-
rized encyclopedia of the Harry Potter series infringed the original
author's copyright. The second case, Peter Letterese and Associates,
Inc. v. World Institute of Scientology,2 determined whether the scien-
tology church infringed an author's copyright protection when the
church, without the author's consent, used content from the author's
book in its materials.
This Comment will first analyze the two recent cases. It will
address the scope of copyright protection that authors are granted, de-
termine when the use of an author's work constitutes copyright in-
fringement, and ascertain when the copyright infringer is entitled to
assert the fair use defense. Lastly, this Comment will address the
* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2010, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I
would like to thank the wonderful people in my life who continually help me to succeed.
First, my husband, Brian, and my children, Cody and Brett, for being so understanding of all
of the family time that I missed during my law school career. Second, Professor Rena Sep-
lowitz for her encouragement and advice throughout each stage of this paper. Third, the
Touro Law Review for its assistance in publishing my Comment. Finally, my mother, Mary
Flammer, and my very dear friends, Sarah Catalan and Jane Liehmann, who were incredibly
supportive throughout my law school journey. I would also like to thank God, who has
helped me at every stage of my life.
1 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
2 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008).
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disparities in the cases, evaluate whether the cases should have been
decided differently, and suggest if the tests used by either court
should be modified.
I. Two RECENT CASES ON COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
A. Harry Potter
In Warner Bros., the famous author J.K. Rowling, along with
Warner Bros., brought a copyright infringement suit against a pub-
lishing company that, without her consent, published an encyclopedia
for Harry Potter fans, titled the Lexicon.3 According to the plaintiffs'
pleadings, the defendant, RDR Books, published a book which
"compile[d] and repackage[d] Ms. Rowling's fictional facts derived
wholesale from the Harry Potter Works without adding any new
creativity, commentary, insight, or criticism." 4 Rowling registered all
of the books in the Harry Potter series and the two companion books
with the United States Copyright Office.' Copyrights are additionally
held by Warner Bros., a business engaged in "creating . .. and mar-
keting motion pictures and goods related to the Harry Potter books,"
for each of the Harry Potter films, which it has produced.6 Rowling
had already begun to write and sell companion books to the Harry
Potter series and designated all profits generated by them to benefit
charities.7 After repeatedly asking the defendant to refrain from pub-
lishing the encyclopedia, Rowling and Warner Bros. filed a lawsuit
asserting that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs' "original copy-
righted material as a basis for the Infringing Book, without permis-
sion. The "[p]laintiffs allege[d] that the Lexicon not only violate[d]
their right of reproduction, but also their right to control the produc-
tion of derivative works." 9 The plaintiffs asked the "[c]ourt [to] find
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 1, Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. RDR Books,
575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-CV-9667), 2008 WL 219213 [hereinafter
Complaint].
4id.
s Id. at 22.
6 Id. at 8.
7 Id. at 2.
8 Complaint, supra note 3, at 9-10(50).
9 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
314 [Vol. 26
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that [d]efendant has infringed [p]laintiffs' copyrights in the Harry
Potter Books, the Companion Books and the Harry Potter Films . . .
[and to grant] [a] permanent injunction restraining [d]efendant ...
from . . . sell[ing] . . . the Infringing Book or any works derived or
copied from [p]laintiffs' copyrighted works."10 The plaintiffs also
sought damages and attorneys' fees."
The defendants claimed that the Lexicon was "an original lite-
rary reference guide.. . . [and] denie[d] that the book . .. infringed
any right belonging to either [p]laintiff."l 2 The defendants further ar-
gued that "[a]ny alleged use of copyrighted material is lawful based
on the doctrine of fair use."13 The court ultimately decided that the
defendants were not protected by the fair use defense; it reasoned that
the "fair-use factors, weighed together in light of the purposes of
copyright law, fail[ed] to support the defense of fair use in this
case."' 4 However, surprisingly, the court determined that the Lexicon
did not constitute a derivative work.'5
B. The Scientology Case
In another recent case, the Eleventh Circuit also dealt with a
copyright infringement claim.16 The plaintiff, Peter Letterese, was "a
principal of PL&A." 7 PL&A had acquired rights to Les Dane's lite-
rary works, including an instructional book on how to close deals en-
titled Big League Sales Closing Techniques ("Big League Sales"),
which was the focus of the litigation.'8
L. Ron Hubbard, who founded the Church of Scientology In-
ternational ("CSI"), recommended the book as a training aid for "re-
gistrars"-members who sell scientology materials and advise mem-
bers.' 9 The church made its own materials such as " 'checksheets'
10 Complaint, supra note 3, at 12-13 (1,7).
" Id. at 10 (52).
12 Defendant's Answer to the First Amended Complaint at 1, Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc.
v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 9667), 2008 WL 678509
[hereinafter Answer].
" Id. at 6(50).
14 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
"s Id. at 539.
16 Letterese, 533 F.3d 1287.
" Id. at 1295.
1 Id. at 1294.
19 Id.
3
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and 'drill sheets' " that were used in conjunction with assigned read-
ings from Big League Sales.20 Members were not given a copy of the
book but were required to obtain a copy on their own.21 Les Dane
was aware of the CSI's use of his book and used the book when giv-
ing seminars to the church.22
The Church of Spiritual Technology ("CST") was developed
in 1982 to inherit Hubbard's estate, "including his intellectual proper-
ty rights." 23 There were two main types of CSI courses that included
study of the book: the "Professional Registration Course" and the
"Organization Executive Course."24 CST obtained the copyrights to
the materials written by Hubbard and licensed them to both CSI and
the World Institute of Scientology Enterprises ("WISE").25 WISE is
a membership organization which sells materials and services on the
application of Hubbard's management techniques to secular organi-
zations.26 CST held the right to review according to a license agree-
ment.27
Bridge Publications ("Bridge"), a company that publishes
scientology materials, sought rights to the book.28 PL&A chose not
to grant Bridge the rights. 29 While PL&A and Dane were in litiga-
tion, Bridge sought the rights directly from Dane; however, it did not
succeed. 30 Although "PL&A and Bridge Publications resumed nego-
tiations ... to publish hard cover versions of the book for internal use
of [c]hurch organizations," the negotiations were unsuccessful.3' De-
spite PL&A's refusal to grant use of Dane's work, CSI and WISE
continued to use checksheets and drill sheets similar to the ones
found in Big League Sales.32 On September 10, 2004, PL&A sued
CSI, CST, and WISE "for the alleged violation of its exclusive rights
pursuant to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 . . . within the three
20 id
21 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1294.
22 id.
23 Id. at 1295.
24 Id. at 1294-95.
25 Id. at 1295.
26 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1295.
27 id
28 Id at 1296.
29 id
30id
3' Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1296.
32 Id. at 1297.
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years prior to filing."33
PL&A alleged "that the WISE Sales Course's checksheets
and drill sheets constitute[d] unauthorized reproductions of Big
League Sales in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)."34 PL&A further
claimed "that the WISE Sales Course as a whole-which includes the
checksheets, drill sheets, and Big League Sales itself-constitute[d]
an infringing derivative work based upon the book in violation of 17
U.S.C. § 106(2)."35 PL&A also named CSI and CST as defendants
and alleged that their "courses such as CSI's Organization Executive
Course and Professional Registration Course . . . . as a whole consti-
tute[d] infringing derivative works based upon the book."36
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants
on the defenses of laches and fair use.37 Therefore, the court did not
fully analyze the copyright claim. On appeal, the defendants asked
the Eleventh Circuit to affirm, stating that the copyright claim was
properly excluded from the district court's analysis because all four
factors of the fair use defense were satisfied.39 However, in its deci-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed both the plaintiffs copyright in-
fringement claim as well as the defendant's fair use defense. 40 The
court affirmed that the use of the materials by CSI was fair, reversed
the lower court's decision that the doctrine of laches prevented the
plaintiff from recovering, and held that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding the substantial similarities of the works and the
use of the materials by WISE.41
II. WHAT IS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION?
Copyright protection is derived from the United States Consti-
tution. Article 1, Section 8 grants Congress the authority "[t]o pro-
34 id.
35 id.
36 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1297-98.
3 Id. at 1298.
38 Id. at 1298-99.
3 Brief of Appellees at 16, Letterese, 533 F.3d 1287 (No. 05-15129-Il), 2006 WL
4121411 [hereinafter Brief]. "The trial court did not reach the question of whether Defen-
dants' use of BLS constitutes infringement because it viewed their use as clearly fair." Id.
40 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1293.
41 Id. at 1317-20.
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mote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for li-
mited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries."42 By allowing the author to have
exclusive control for a limited time period, the author is given incen-
tive to create.43 When the time period expires, the work enters the
public domain, benefiting society."
Copyright protection is given to original expressions mani-
fested in a tangible form.45 The current copyright law, found under
the 1976 Copyright Act, provides a copyright holder with six exclu-
sive rights, including the right to reproduce and the right to create de-
rivative works.46 Although the holder of a copyright has the right to
control how his work is used and who is permitted to use it, the pro-
tection is only for the original expression of the author,47 and "it does
not extend to any underlying ideas, procedures, processes, and sys-
tems."" The events following a common theme are indispensable
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43 Naomi Jane Gray, Overview of Copyright Basics and Basics of the Copyright Office,
in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
PLI ORDER No. 11270 25, 31 (2007).
44Id.
45 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1302; 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2009).
46 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2009). The full text of the rights given under Section 106 of
the 1976 Copyright Act are:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lend-
ing;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to per-
form the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to dis-
play the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
47 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1302; 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b).
48 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1302 (citing Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm't, 193 F.3d 1241,
1248 (11th Cir. 1999)).
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elements of a particular topic, and are not copyrightable.49
III. How is COPYRIGHT INFRINGED? THE FEIST TEST
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.s held
that two prongs must be satisfied to establish copyright infringement:
"(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original.""
A. What Constitutes Copying?
In Warner Bros., since ownership was not in dispute-the no-
vels had valid copyrights-the court focused only on the second Feist
prong. 52 To establish the second element, a plaintiff is required to
prove "two components: first, . . . actual copying by either direct or
indirect evidence; then, . . . that the copying amount[ed] to an impro-
per or unlawful appropriation."53 The test to determine whether the
appropriation is actionable is whether the second work has a 'sub-
stantial similarity' to the protected work.54  Since the defendants,
RDR Books, admitted to copying and scanning the original work, the
only question remaining was whether the works were substantially
similar. 5
Similarly, the Letterese case looked to Feist in determining
whether a prima facie case of copyright infringement occurred.56 Just
as in Warner Bros., the plaintiff owned a valid copyright, leaving on-
ly the second Feist element in dispute. Here too, the defendants did
not contest that as a factual matter copying had occurred.58  There-
49 Id. (citing Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1248).
s0 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
" Id. at 361.
52 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34.
5 Id. at 533 (citing Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc. 150 F.3d 132,
137 (2d Cir. 1998); Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992)).
54 Id. (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 137); Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc.,
126 F.3d 70, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (Matthew Bender & Co. 2008) [hereinafter NIMMER]).
ss Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 533-34.
56 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1300 (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2001)).
57Id.
ss Id. at 1301.
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fore, analogous to the Warner Bros. case, the Letterese court was re-
quired to analyze the second component of the Feist test, whether ap-
propriation was actionable.59 Applying the same test used in Warner
Bros., the court focused on the question of " 'whether there [was a]
'substantial similarity' between the allegedly offending [works] and
the protectable, original elements' of the book."60
B. How do the Courts Analyze Whether There is a
Substantial Similarity?
"[S]ubstantial similarity between the plaintiffs and defen-
dant's works is an essential element of actionable copying." 61 To de-
termine if the works are substantially similar, an "evaluation must
occur in the context of each case, both qualitatively and quantitative-
ly."62 "The quantitative relation of the similar material to the total
material contained in plaintiffs work is certainly of importance." 63
However, substantial similarity may be found when "the similar ma-
terial is quantitatively small," but is nevertheless "qualitatively im-
portant." 64 Moreover, there are two different ways to find substantial
similarity: by finding comprehensive non-literal similarity (the over-
all structure is the same-but not the language) or by finding frag-
mented literal similarity (when the second work consists of similar or
paraphrased language of the first text).65 Thus, it is possible to find
substantial similarity even when the text of the allegedly infringing
work does not contain the exact text of the original work. In both of
the cases discussed, the courts determined whether there was substan-
tial similarity between the two works by analyzing the qualita-
tive/quantitative and comprehensive non-literal/fragmented literal as-
pects.66
59 id.
6o Id. (citing Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1224 n.5
(11th Cir. 2008); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996)).
61 NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A].
62 Id. § 13.03[A][2][a].
63 Id.
6 Id.
65 NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A].
66 See Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1307; Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 533-35.
[Vol. 26320
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1. Qualitative v. Quantitative
The court in Warner Bros. used the qualitative/quantitative
test outlined in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc. and
Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. to
determine if the Lexicon was substantially similar to Rowling's
work. 67 This test asks the question of whether " 'the copying is quan-
titatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion
that infringement (actionable copying) has occurred.' "68
In Ringgold, the Second Circuit was faced with the question
of whether a television show that had an artist's unauthorized work
visible in several scenes had infringed the author's copyright.69 In its
analysis, the court stated that "substantial similarity[] requires that the
copying is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the
legal conclusion that infringement (actionable copying) has oc-
curred."70 Ringgold further explained that "the qualitative component
concerns the copying of expression . . . . [and] [t]he quantitative
component generally concerns the amount of the copyrighted
work."7 1 The defendants in Ringgold argued that "the nine instances
in their television program in which portions of the poster were visi-
ble, individually and in the aggregate, were de minimis, in the sense
that the quantity of copying .. . was below the threshold of actionable
copying." 72 "[T]he defendants further contend[ed] that the segments
showing any portion of the poster [were] de minimis from the stand-
point of qualitative sufficiency" because the poster was not discerna-
ble by viewers.73 The court found that the "threshold for actionable
copying of protected expression has been crossed" because the four
to five seconds the painting was visible was reinforced by the scat-
tered seconds in which the poster was partially displayed; additional-
ly, it determined that the qualitative component had also been suffi-
cient because a lay observer could recognize the painting.7 4
Therefore, the court held that substantial similarity was established
6 575 F. Supp. 2d at 534-35.
68 Id. at 534 (quoting Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75).
6' Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 72-73.
70 Id. at 75.
71 id
72 Id. at 76.
7 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 77.
74 Id. at 76-77.
9
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and the copying was actionable.
In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit applied the qualita-
tive/quantitative test it laid out in Ringgold.76 The court faced the is-
sue of whether a book comprised of facts of the copyrighted televi-
sion show, Seinfeld, infringed the producer's copyright.n The court
held that the defendant, by copying 643 fragments of the television
series, had "crossed the quantitative copying threshold under Ring-
gold."7 8 The court further held that the qualitative aspect had been
met because the trivia questions were, in reality, based not on facts,
but rather on fictitious expression.79 Therefore, the court, applying
the Ringgold test, found the materials were substantially similar.o
Warner Bros., following Ringgold and Castle Rock, addressed
the quantitative component by investigating "the amount of the copy-
righted work that [had been] copied."8 ' The court found that "[m]ost
of the . . . entries contain[ed] direct quotations or paraphrases, plot
details, or summaries of scenes" and that the "quantum of copying
[was] sufficient to support a finding of substantial similarity." 82 The
court then went on to evaluate the quantitative aspect by considering
both the similar paraphrasing and verbatim language.83 The court
found that the plaintiffs sustained their burden by "show[ing] that the
Lexicon draws its content from creative, original expression in the
Harry Potter series and companion books." 84 Similar to Castle Rock,
each Harry Potter fact is, in reality, the author's expression of fic-
81tion.
The defendants argued that the Lexicon was not qualitative
because, unlike Castle Rock, " 'the Lexicon use[d] fictional facts
primarily in their factual capacity' " to instruct readers on where to
find the Harry Potter information.86 The court agreed that the issue
" Id. at 77.
76 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 138.
" Id. at 135.
78 Id. at 138.
79 Id. at 138-39.
s0 Id at 139.
Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 534 (citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75).
82 Id. at 535.
83 id.
8 Id. at 536.
85 id,
86 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (citations omitted).
322 [Vol. 26
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was important, but stated that it was not relevant to the question of
whether "on its face" the two works were substantially similar
enough to cause infringement; instead, it should be addressed under
the fair use defense. Analogous to Castle Rock, the Warner Bros.
court concluded that, because the copied text was neither a fact nor
an idea, it was the author's original expression and, therefore, pro-
tected under the copyright law.88
The Letterese court also analyzed whether the works were
substantially similar by assessing the quantitative and qualitative as-
pects.89 Analogous to the defendant in Ringgold, the defendant in
Letterese argued that his works did not constitute infringement, be-
cause the amount of copying was de minimis.90 The defendant in Let-
terese further claimed that the alleged infringing works copied only a
small amount of the original work and, relying on Nimmer on Copy-
right, stated that the amount was not enough to be considered action-
able.91 Similar to Warner Bros., the court applied the Ringgold test
and explained that, even if the alleged infringing work only uses a
small portion of the original work, it may still be actionable "because
it is the relative portion of the copyrighted work-not the relative
portion of the infringing work-that is the relevant comparison."92
The court held that the sections copied were so qualitatively impor-
tant, especially the portions used in the sales drill materials, that
summary judgment should not be granted in favor of the defen-
dants. 93
2. Comprehensive Non-Literal v. Fragmented
Literal
The defendant in Warner Bros., knowing that a substantial
amount of the Lexicon was similar to Rowling's work, argued that the
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1307.
90 Id. at 1306.
91 See id. at 1306-07 (pointing out that the defendant was relying on Melville B. Nimmer
& David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.01[G], which states "for similarity to be sub-
stantial, and hence actionable, it must apply to more than simply a de minimus fragment")
(quoting NIMMER, supra note 50, § 8.01[G]).
92 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1307.
93 Id.
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court should only look at the order of the facts, not the similarity of
the text, when determining whether two works were substantially
similar.94 The defendant urged that, although the Lexicon and Rowl-
ing's work may have similar fictional facts, the order of the facts was
different and, therefore, substantial similarity could not be estab-
lished.95 However, the court disagreed with the defendant and stated
that the standard to find substantial similarity did not rest with the or-
der of the text.96
According to Nimmer on Copyright, there are two different
ways to find substantial similarity.9 7 The first is comprehensive non-
literal similarity, which refers to the entire structure of plaintiffs
work. 98 "[C]omprehensive similarity [exists] between [] two works .
. . where the fundamental essence or structure of one work is dupli-
cated in another . .. but no word-for-word or other literal similarity
[exists]." 99 The second is fragmented literal similarity, which is
when localized language in plaintiffs and defendant's works is simi-
lar or paraphrased. 00 With fragmented literal similarity, "[t]he ques-
tion in each case is whether the similarity relates to matter that consti-
tutes a substantial portion of plaintiffs work-not whether such
material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant's work[;]"
thus, even if only a small amount of the defendant's work is similar
to the plaintiff s work, "if it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact
may properly find substantial similarity." 01
The court in Warner Bros. clarified that the law in the Second
Circuit has found substantial similarity to occur not only when there
are " 'global similarities in structure and sequence,' " but also when
fragmented literal similarity occurs.102 Therefore, the court held that
order does not preclude substantial similarity.103 Similar to Castle
Rock, where statements from the show were used out of order, the
94 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37.
s See id.
96 Id. at 537.
97 NIMMER, supra note 50, § 13.03[A].
98 Id
9 Id. § 13.03[A][1].
100 Id. § 13.03[A][2].
o'0 Id § 13.03[A][2][a].
102 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (quoting Twin Peaks Prod., Inc. v. Publ'n In-
tern., Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993)).
103 id
324 [Vol. 26
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statements, here, used in the Lexicon, though maybe out of order,
consist of enough direct quotes and paraphrased material to be found
substantially similar.104 Therefore, despite the difference in the way
the material was ordered, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case
of copyright infringement.'o
In Letterese, the court's analysis revealed "both fragmented
literal similarity and comprehensive nonliteral similarity of protected
expression."106 In contrast to Warner Bros., the court in Letterese
found the substantial similarity rested on the structure of the defen-
dant's work in comparison to the plaintiffs work. 0 7 The sales tech-
niques in both the WISE and CSI materials were ordered similarly to
the way the Big League Sales book was ordered, and the scientology
materials also used Les Dane's opinion on the most effective way to
employ the sales techniques.10 The court noted that even the manner
in which material was tracked and organized may evidence a " 'fun-
damental essence or structure of one work [which] is duplicated in
another.' "109 Therefore, the court held that non-literal similarity of
protected expression may be established by the organization of the
content. 0
Next, the court in Letterese analyzed whether the amount of
literal similarities between the two works alone was enough to estab-
lish substantial similarity. The court investigated the literal similari-
ties, noting that fragmented literal similarity will "rise to the level of
substantial similarity '[i]f this fragmented copy is important to the
copyrighted work, and of sufficient quantity.' ""' The defendant ar-
gued that the copied text did not constitute infringement because al-
most all of the text that it copied from Big League Sales was of "short
phrases, titles, unprotected methods or procedures, or concepts that
Dane admittedly took from others."ll 2 However, the court held that,
although Dane used some uncopyrightable short phrases, his " 'se-
quence of thoughts, choice of words, emphasis, and arrangement'
1" Id.
'05 See id. at 538.
'0 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1303.
107 See id.
'0 Id. at 1302-03.
109 Id. at 1304 n.19 (quoting Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002)).
"o Id. at 1303.
" Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1304 n.19 (quoting Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1330).
112 Id. at 1305.
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were his expression and therefore copyrightable. 113
The court relied on the holding of Salinger v. Random House,
Inc.114 in making its decision. 115 In Salinger, the defendant wrote a
biography consisting of unpublished letters."16 The defendant argued
that only a small amount of the copyrighted expression was copied." 7
However, the court in Salinger held that when "the 'association,
presentation and combination of the ideas and thought' " make up the
structure, the structure and presentation become the author's expres-
sion and are protected."'
Thus, based on the holding in Salinger, the Letterese court
reasoned that although Dane may have used text that originated from
others, it was not determinative.1 19 However, the court did note that a
relevant factor "for the purposes of copyright law is that an abstract
idea is never eligible for copyright protection." 2 0 While Dane could
not protect the "underlying sales techniques," he could protect the
presentation of ideas and his choice of structure because, just like in
Salinger, it became his original expression and was therefore pro-
tected.'21
Determining whether a work is an idea or expression is often
a blurry line.122 However, the more the work consists of similar plots
and characters, the more likely the work will be deemed to be expres-
sion.123  Therefore, even though the allegedly infringing text may
have originally come from different authors or was in the public do-
main, it may nevertheless be infringing if the text is used or com-
bined in the same manner or structure as was done by the original au-
thor.124  When a work contains an amount of paraphrasing and
virtually identical examples of another author's work substantial
enough to establish a "finding of literal similarity," copyright has
113 Id. at 1306 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1987)).
114 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
"' Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1306 (citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92).
116 id.
117 id.
118 Id (quoting Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98).
"' Id. at 1305.
120 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1305 (emphasis omitted).
121 Id. at 1305-06.
122 Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1266.
123 Id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 54, § 2.12).
124 See Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1306.
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been infringed. 125
IV. ARE THE SCIENTOLOGY MATERIALS OR THE LEXICON
DERIVATIVE WORKS?
As stated in Section 106(2) of the 1976 Copyright Act, the
copyright holder's rights include the right to make derivative
works.126 The 1976 Copyright Act defines a derivative work as "a
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla-
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, con-
densation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted." 27 "A work consisting of editorial revisions, an-
notations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' ",128
Therefore, the copyright holder is the only person who can decide if
her book will become a movie or if a sequel will be created. 129
In determining whether the Lexicon was a derivative work
with respect to Rowling's planned encyclopedia, the Warner Bros.
court relied on two Second Circuit cases, Twin Peaks and Castle
Rock, as well as one Seventh Circuit case, Ty, Inc. v. Publications In-
ternational Ltd.13 0
In Twin Peaks, the defendant wrote an unauthorized guide
book based on the first season of a television show named "Twin
Peaks." 1 3 1 The guide book described the episodes, had additional
commentary on the show and the actors, and included a trivia
game.132 After finding that the two works were substantially similar,
the Second Circuit next addressed the question of whether the guide
book was a derivative work of the television show.'3 3 The court held
125 Id. at 1304-05.
126 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2).
127 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
128 id.
129 Lisa C. Dejaco, What Use Is Fair? The Line Between Derivative Works and Trans-
formative Use, 55 FED. LAW. 14, 14 (2008).
130 See Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
'" Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1370.
132 id
133 Id at 1373.
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that it was.134 It reasoned that "[t]he [b]ook contain[ed] a substantial
amount of material from the teleplays, transformed from one medium
into another."13 5 The court additionally stated that, although
[t]he author of "Twin Peaks" cannot preserve for itself
the entire field of publishable works that wish to cash
in on the "Twin Peaks" phenomenon[,] . . . . it may
rightfully claim a favorable weighting of the fourth
fair use factor with respect to a book that reports the
plot in such extraordinary detail as to risk impairment
of the market for the copyrighted works themselves or
derivative works that the author is entitled to li-
cense.136
The court noted that a market for derivative works may exist when an
author would likely have an interest in entering the field herself; thus,
the market for guidebooks such as Twin Peaks was dissimilar to a
market for parodies, because "[c]opyright holders rarely write paro-
dies of their own works."' 37 Moreover, a derivative market for Twin
Peaks guidebooks was evidenced by the fact that the plaintiff had al-
ready granted licenses for two books and foresaw licensing more.138
In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit addressed the question of
whether "The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a trivia quiz book devoted ex-
clusively to testing its readers' recollection of scenes and events from
the fictional television series Seinfeld" infringed the copyright of
Seinfeld, or whether it was a fair use.139 Although the court did not
address whether the trivia book constituted a derivative work, the
court did hold that it would harm the author's market for derivative
works.140 The court noted that the trivia book, referring to the Sein-
feld show, used only Seinfeld facts.14' Furthermore, the court, similar
to Twin Peaks, reasoned, the market for trivia books was unlike a
market for parodies, which a copyright holder was unlikely to enter,
134 id
131 Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1377.
138 id
139 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 135.
140 Id. at 145.
141 Id. at 138-39.
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but filled a niche that the copyright holder could conceivably fill or
license to someone else to fill. 142 The court further reasoned that
even though Seinfeld had not expressed an interest in filling that
niche, it was nevertheless the copyright holder's choice. 143
The Seventh Circuit has concluded that authors are free to
write their evaluations on other pre-existing copyrighted works with-
out constituting a derivative work. 144 In a case about beanie babies,
Ty, Inc., an author wrote a collector's guide for beanie babies, which
are a brand of stuffed animals that the author did not create.145 When
Ty, Inc., the makers of the beanie babies, claimed the guide was a de-
rivative work, the court disagreed. 1 46 Although the court conceded
that it "[could not] find a case on the point," it nevertheless held that
collectors' guides are not derivative works, because they "don't re-
cast, transform, or adapt the things to which they are guides."1 47
The plaintiffs in Warner Bros. argued that based on Twin
Peaks, companion guides can be considered derivative works if they
contain a substantial amount of copyrighted material. 14 8 The Warner
Bros. court claimed the argument was unpersuasive because it over-
looked two differences in the current case. 14 9 First, the Lexicon's use
of plot elements was far from an " 'elaborate recounting of plot de-
tails' " and it did not follow the same plot structure as the book.so
On this point the court's logic seems inconsistent with the Castle
Rock decision, which also relied on Twin Peaks. In Castle Rock, the
facts copied were separate trivia questions, were far from recounting
plot details, and were not in the same order as the television series;
yet the court held it would harm the author's market for derivative
works.15 1 However, the court held it was the author's choice to de-
termine if she wanted to license out the right to create it as a deriva-
142 Id. at 145. ("Unlike parody, criticism, scholarship, news reporting, or other transfor-
mative uses, The SAT substitutes for a derivative market that a television program copyright
owner such as Castle Rock 'would in general develop or license others to develop.' ") Id.
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994)).
143 Castle Rock, 150 F3d at 145-46.
14 Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 521 (7th Cir. 2002).
145 Id. at 515.
146 Id. at 518.
147 Id. at 520.
148 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39.
149 Id. at 539.
15o Id. (quoting Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1373).
151 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145.
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tive work.152 Although the court stated this while analyzing the fair
use defense factors, by asserting that the trivia game would have in-
terfered with the author's right to create a derivative work, the court
is acknowledging that recounting plot details and presenting the de-
tails in the same order as the original author's work are not necessary
elements for a work to be considered a derivative. Second, the
Warner Bros. court said that where the Twin Peaks guide merely
transformed an existing work from one media to another, here, the
Lexicon did not recast, but "instead [gave] the copyrighted material
another purpose."l 53 The court analogized the Lexicon to the Ty, Inc.
beanie baby guide and said both were not derivatives, because they
gave readers an understanding of an existing work. 5 4 The court in
Warner Bros. explained that the Lexicon could not be considered a
derivative work because imparted a deeper understanding of the Har-
ry Potter elements. 55 This, too, seems to be faulty logic. Although
the Twin Peaks court did say "the Book contain[ed] a substantial
amount of material from the teleplays, transformed from one medium
into another," the infringing work also had additional commentary on
the cast, the plots, and essential people involved in making the show,
as well as answered questions that the show left unanswered. 156 The
infringing book in Twin Peaks was, like the Lexicon, giving readers a
deeper understanding of the author's original work; in fact, the in-
fringing book in Twin Peaks went beyond the author's work and gave
insight into how the show was made. 157 However, the Warner Bros.
court applied its faulty logic and held that the Lexicon was dissimilar
152 Id. at 145-46.
153 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
154 id.
1s5 id.
16 Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1370.
15s Id.
The 128-page book has seven chapters, dealing with, respectively, (1)
the popularity of the show; (2) the characters and the actors who play
them; (3) the plots of the eight episodes, some commentary on the plots,
and "unanswered questions"; (4) David Lynch, the creator of the show;
(5) Mark Frost, the producer of the show, and Snoqualmie, Washington,
the location of the show; (6) the music of the show; and (7) trivia ques-
tions and quotations constituting the 'wit and wisdom of Agent Cooper,'
one of the characters.
Id.
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to Twin Peaks.58 Furthermore, the Warner Bros. court held that be-
cause the Lexicon pulled work from other sources, it no longer
represented the original work of Rowling.159 Thus, the court held that
the Lexicon could not constitute a derivative work under 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 101.160
This decision seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Campbell.16' Although the Court in Campbell did not de-
termine whether 2 Live Crew's song constituted a derivative work,
while analyzing the factor for potential market harm, the Court made
it clear that a work containing a transformative element, even when it
substantially changes the original author's work, can still be consi-
dered a derivative.162 If the Supreme Court believed that works were
derivatives only when the defendant's work was introduced directly
into the plaintiffs underlying work, it would not have explored
whether a song categorized by the Court as a 'ballad' had a market
for derivative works in the rap field.'63 Once the court found the rap
song was a parody, it no longer represented the author's original
work; it was transformative.164 However, the Court in Campbell did
not stop there; instead, the Court stated that "[t]he market for poten-
tial derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works
would in general develop or license others to develop." 65 Therefore,
the Court acknowledged that it must look to the "harm of market
substitution."l 66 Although this analysis was done under the fair use
discussion, the Court is implicitly stating that derivative works in-
clude works that expand beyond the scope of the original author's
work, as long as it could be categorized as a type of work "that crea-
tors of original works would in general develop or license others to
develop."l 67
"[L]icensing of derivatives is an important economic incen-
158 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
15s Id.
160 id.
161 See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
162 Id. at 590.
163 Id.
6' Id. at 581-82.
161 Id. at 592.
'6 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
167 Id. at 590-93.
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tive to the creation of originals."l68 In Campbell, the Supreme Court
determined that there was an existing market for rap and then said the
appropriate question was whether the alleged infringement interfered
with the plaintiffs reasonable chance to enter that market or license
out the right to someone else for that market.169 If it did, the Court
concluded, the infringing work acted as a substitute and could, there-
fore, be a derivative work.170 Thus, although the Supreme Court dis-
cussed this aspect under its market harm analysis, it nevertheless rec-
ognized that a work could be considered a derivative even if it
consisted of more than the original author's work. In fact, applying
the Supreme Court's analysis, the relevant inquiry to determine
whether the Lexicon constituted a derivative work would be whether
a market for a Harry Potter encyclopedia existed, and if it did, the al-
legedly infringing work could constitute a derivative work.17 1 It
seems that that the collector's book in Ty, Inc., consisting of color
pictures of the copyrighted collector items, and the Lexicon encyclo-
pedia, consisting of material from a copyrighted book series, both fall
into that category. Thus, the decisions in Warner Bros. and Ty, Inc.
do not appear to be consistent with Campbell.
In Letterese, the court stated that a "derivative work [must]
'recast, transform[], or adapt[]' " the preexisting work, and, " 'as a
whole, represent [the] original work of authorship.' ,172 PL&A ar-
gued that the infringing works of both CSI and WISE constituted de-
rivative works, because the defendants used the drill sheets and
checksheets in a similar way to the Mirage Editions v. Albuquerque
A.R. T. case.173 In Mirage, the Ninth Circuit held that a piece of art-
work cut out and pasted to a tile constituted a derivative work.174 The
court in Mirage reasoned that, although the purchaser may have a
right to sell his copy of the work, once he "remov[ed] the . .. images
from the book and plac[ed] them on the tiles .... [he] ha[d] certainly
168 Id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (stating that a copyright owner also has the right to
"prepare derivative works").
161 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589-93.
170 Id. at 593.
171 Id.
172 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1299-1300 (quoting 17 U.S.C.A. § 101).
17 Id. (citing Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir.
1988)).
174 Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1344.
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recast or transformed [the work] . . . by incorporating them." Fur-
thermore, the court in Mirage held that, because Congress had in-
tended derivative work violations to occur when a defendant " 'in-
corporate[s] a portion of the copyrighted work in some form,' "the
defendant had, in fact, recast the work as prohibited by the statute. 176
The Eleventh Circuit, in Letterese, was not persuaded and
stated that Mirage was decided incorrectly.'7 7 It reasoned that, even
if it chose to follow the Ninth Circuit's rationale, the two cases were
completely dissimilar.'7 8 Where the Mirage case was on the outer
limits and dealt with exact copies, here, the defendants did not photo-
copy.179 The lithograms in Mirage were not transformed in the sligh-
test and, in the case at bar, the defendants had entirely different mate-
rials, which used the drill sheets and checksheets in conjunction with
lawfully acquired copies of the original book. 80 The court pointed
out that the Mirage case has been frowned upon by many circuits be-
cause it did not take into account the possibility of " 'recast[ing],
transform[ing], or adapt[ing] the preexisting work.' " 181
The court in Letterese, looked to 17 U.S.C.A. § 101, and
found "the book [was] not a part of defendants' courses in the sense
that the checksheets, drill sheets, and book 'as a whole, represent[ed]
an original work of authorship.' "182 The court in Letterese found the
logic the Seventh Circuit applied in Lee to be more sound than that of
the Ninth Circuit in Mirage.183 In Lee, the court found that when an
original work is unchanged yet affixed to a new work, it is not a de-
rivative.184 The original work had remained untouched and, because
it had not been "recast, transformed, or adapted," it had not violated
the copyright holder's protection. ss
The Letterese Court held that the scientology materials did
17 id.
176 Id. (quoting 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 5659, 5675.
.. Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1299.
.78 Id. at 1300.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1300 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 101).
183 Id. (citing Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Lee, 125 F.3d at 581.
Id. at 582.
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not constitute derivative works. 186 The court reasoned that "PL&A's
argument reduce[d] simply to the flightless claim that selling the
course materials (specifically, selling the checksheets and drill sheets
to be used with lawfully acquired copies of the book) facilitates a
'remounting' of Big League Sales." 187
V. BUT WAS THERE INFRINGEMENT? THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
The analysis for copyright infringement does not end simply
because a prima facie case has been established.'8 8 The next part of
the inquiry is whether the infringer has a valid defense. In both cas-
es, the defendants asserted the fair use defense.189 The fair use de-
fense is designed to "fulfill copyright's very purpose, 'to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.' " 190 It is usually asserted "for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, . . .
scholarship, or research." 191 "The ultimate test of fair use, therefore,
is whether the copyright law's goal of 'promoting the Progress of
Science and useful Arts' . . . 'would be better served by allowing the
use than by preventing it.' "192 Thus, under 17 U.S.C.A. § 107, an
unauthorized work may not be deemed to be infringing if it satisfies
the elements of the fair use defense.193
In Campbell, the Supreme Court faced the question of wheth-
er a rap group under the moniker 2 Live Crew, who used the work of
another artist, Roy Orbison, in producing a parody could be a fair use
under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.194 The Court noted that
there was enough substantial similarity between the two works to
constitute a prima facie case of infringement, and, depending on the
application of the fair use factors, the defendant's infringement may
be actionable.' 95 The Court stated that 2 Live Crew had created a pa-
.86 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1300.
187 id
188 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
189 See id. at 539; Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1298.
so Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
'9' 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West 2009).
192 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Arica Inst., Inc.
v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1077 (2d. Cir. 1992)); see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
19' 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
1 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571-72.
195 Id. at 572. (acknowledging that a prima facie case of infringement exists).
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rody, which is a form of criticism entitled to the defense.196 The fact
that the song was a parody did not end the analysis of fair use, but
began the application of the fair use factors to determine if the origi-
nal artist's copyright had indeed been infringed.197
The fair use defense requires the analysis of four factors: "the
purpose and character of the use"; "the nature of the copyrighted
work"; "the amount and substantiality of the portion [taken]"; and
"the effect of the use upon the potential market." 98
A. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor, purpose and character of the use, is a question
of "whether the use is non-commercial or for non-profit educational
purposes and whether the use is consumptive or transformative." 99
To determine if the work is transformative, a court determines if it
adds value to the original. 200 Although all four factors are consi-
dered, the more transformative the work is, the less significant the
other factors will be. 20' To be transformative, the "new work [must]
take[] copyrighted elements and say[] something new about them."202
New authors are prevented from creating sequels; however, if the al-
leged infringing work adds a significant amount of new expression, it
may be considered to be so different from the original that it is trans-
formative, and this factor may tip in the defendant's direction.203
This is illustrated by Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., a case
discussed by the Eleventh Circuit.204
In Suntrust, an author created a book using the same charac-
ters as "Gone with the Wind."205 The alleged infringing book was
196 Id. at 583, 594 ("[Tlhis joinder of reference and ridicule that marks off the author's
choice of parody from the other types of comment and criticism that traditionally have had a
claim to fair use protection as transformative works.").
19 Id. at 574.
198 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
'" Karen S. Frank, Fair Use: The Changing Balance, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
PLI ORDER No. 17006 473 (2008).
200 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
201 id.
202 Dejaco, supra note 124, at 15.
203 Id. at 14.
204 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
205 Id. at 1259.
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written from a different perspective-from the slave's point of
206view. The court said that, although it was necessary to rely on
"Gone with the Wind," the second book was from an entirely differ-
ent viewpoint and contained enough new expression to be considered
transformative; as a result, the scales tipped in the defendant's fa-
vor.207 In contrast, when a defendant simply copies the original au-
thor's expression, it is unlikely that a court will make a finding that
the work is transformative. In Castle Rock, the Second Circuit held
that copying fictional facts from a television show to create a game,
201
which is based on that show, falls short of being transformative.
The court rejected the defendant's assertion of the fair use defense
and disagreed with the claim that the infringing work transformed the
Seinfeld television series into an unauthorized trivia book of Seinfeld
facts.209
The Court in Campbell held that the infringing rap song was a
parody. 210 The Court reasoned that, since a parody is criticism of the
author's original work, it has transformative value. 21' The petitioner
argued that any parodic use should be presumed fair.212 However, the
Court held that a work may have both parodic and non-parodic
uses. 21 Thus, when the work goes beyond parody, a court must look
"to the work's other elements." 214 In addition, the Court stated that
although 2 Live Crew's song had commercial value, that was only
one part of the first factor and was not determinative. 2 15
Applying the transformative analysis to the Warner Bros.
case, the court held that the alleged infringing work did add value.216
It reasoned that since the Lexicon was a reference guide for Harry
Potter readers, it "demonstrate[d] a productive use for a different
purpose than the original works."217 Unlike Castle Rock and Twin
206 Id. at 1267.
207 Id. at 1269.
208 Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141.
209 id.
210 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
211 id.
212 Id. at 581.
213 id
214 Id. at 571.
215 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
216 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
217 Id. at 542.
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Peaks, the court stated, the Lexicon was not just an abridged version
of the original work.218 Despite the plaintiffs claim that the second
work was not transformative because there was no analysis or com-
mentary, the court said that "is not determinative of whether or not its
purpose is transformative." 219 Instead, the court must look at the
chief contribution. 220 Here, although there was a contribution, "[t]he
transformative character . . . [was] diminished . . . because the ...
work[] [was] not consistently transformative." 2 21 The defendant ar-
gued that the purpose of the book was transformative because it was a
useful reference to the Harry Potter books.222 However, the court
found the transformative purpose was not achieved because the Lex-
icon often did not cite sources and the excessive verbatim copying
exceeded what was "reasonably necessary [and] diminishe[d] a find-
ing of a transformative use."223 Therefore, the Lexicon's transforma-
tive purpose as a useful reference was not achieved. 224
The court found that although the commercial/nonprofit in-
quiry is a fundamental aspect under this factor, because the case at
hand involved profit, it was not of significant importance.225 Instead,
the court determined "[t]he real concern behind the commercial na-
ture inquiry is 'the unfairness that arises when a secondary user
makes unauthorized use of copyrighted material to capture significant
revenues as a direct consequence of copying original work.' "226 This
is more likely to be found if the work is for the public good, but be-
cause here there is a commercial nature, the court determined it "only
weigh[ed] slightly against a finding of fair use."227
Applying this factor to Letterese, the court first addressed the
question of whether the work was educational or commercial.228 The
court held that although the work had educational aspects, the defen-
218 Id. at 538.
219 Id. at 543.
220 Id.
221 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
222 Id. at 542-44.
223 Id. at 544.
224 id.
225 Id. at 545.
226 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 545. (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253
(2d Cir. 2006)).
227 id.
228 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1309.
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dants, nevertheless, were in a position to profit commercially.22 9
WISE charged seventy-five dollars per course pack, and CSI obtained
a promissory note in the event that the course was not completed.230
Therefore, the sale of defendants' work produced commercial prof-
it.231
In determining the purpose and character of the use, the Lette-
rese court stated that the proper question was whether the work was
transformative or superseding.232 If the work was transformative, as
in Suntrust, where the second book inverted the race roles portrayed
in the original, then the factor would more likely benefit the defen-
dant.233 However, if the work had some original aspects but merely
superseded the original by fulfilling the same " 'overall function,'
the plaintiffs would have the stronger argument.234
The court determined, in Letterese, that although the two
works were in different formats and the second work had additional
tools, they both used the same instructional techniques on how to
close a deal, and, therefore, fulfilled the same educational purpose. 235
Because the educational character had not changed, the second work
merely emphasized the original, but did not transform "the overall
purpose and function of the book."236  Thus, this factor favored
PL&A.23
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
This factor looks at the " 'hierarchy of copyright protec-
tions.' "238 The "law . . . recognizes a greater need to disseminate
factual works than works of fiction or fantasy." 239 The appropriate
question to consider is whether the original work is creative and high-
229 Id. at 1310.
230 id
231 id.
232 Id. at 1309.
233 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1310-12.
234 Id. at 1310-11 (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).
235 Id. at 1311.
236 id.
237 Id. at 1312.
238 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1271).
239 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
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ly protected or factual and less protected.240
In Campbell, the Court stated that some works are "closer to
the core of intended copyright protection than others." 24 ' The Court
further stated that Orbison's original song had creative expression,
which was protected.242 However, the Court found that applying this
factor to the case was not very helpful, because parodies almost al-
ways copy the expressive work.243
In Warner Bros., the court concluded that the Harry Potter
works were fictional works and, as a result, were afforded a high lev-
el of protection.2" Thus, the balance of this factor was tipped in the
plaintiff s direction.245
In contrast, the court in Letterese found the Big League Sales
book fell under the category of factual works.2 46 Although the court
noted the book had some fanciful elements, there were not enough to
result in the higher level of protection granted to fictional works.247
The court further noted that the status of the work-whether pub-
lished or unpublished and in print or withdrawn-also afforded dif-
ferent levels of protection.24 8 Although the sales book was out of
print, it was entitled to the fair use defense because it was intentional-
ly withdrawn as part of the author's strategy.249 Thus, the court in
Letterese concluded this factor was neutral to both parties.250
C. Amount of Work Used
The third factor is "the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." 251' This fac-
tor asks the question "whether the amount used, even if small, con-
240 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563; Castle
Rock, 150 F.3d at 144; Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1376; Ty, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d at 713).
241 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990)).
242 Id.
243 id.
244 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
245 Id.
246 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1312.
247 id.
248 Id. at 1313.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 1314.
251 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.
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sists of the essence of the protected work."252
In Campbell, the Court analyzed the quantitative and qualita-
tive aspects. 253 The Court stated that with a parody there is a need to
copy the heart of the work and take enough of the original work to
make "its critical wit recognizable." 2 54 The Court also stated the con-
text of the copying must be analyzed.255 In Campbell, there were ad-
ditional sounds and new lyrics.256 Therefore, the Court found that
2 Live Crew did not take more than what was needed.257
Applying this analysis to Warner Bros., the plaintiffs "ar-
gue[d] . . . that the Lexicon takes too much original expression ... to
be fair use." 258 However, the question is "whether the amount and
value of Plaintiffs' original expression used are reasonable in relation
to the Lexicon's transformative purpose." 259 Answering this question,
the court said the defendants did take more than was reasonable.260
The heaviest factor weighing against the defendant was the "verbatim
copying and close paraphrasing of language from the Harry Potter
works." 26 1
When the text that is copied is central to the entertainment
factor, even small amounts can be considered too much.262 In Craft
v. Kobler, the court found that three percent exceeded a reasonable
limit because it was the "most entertaining part." 263 And in Salinger,
the court held that the "copier [was] not entitled to copy the vividness
of author's description for the sake of accura[cy] .264 Moreover, the
amount of copied text needed to constitute infringement may be satis-
fied by a lesser requirement in the case of a fictional work as opposed
to a factual work.265 As a result, because the Harry Potter series is
under the umbrella of creative works, the plaintiffs were entitled to
252 Frank, supra note 199, at 474.
253 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
254 Id. at 588.
255 Id. at 589.
256 id
257 Id.
258 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
259 Id.
260 id.
261 Id. at 547.
262 Id.
263 667 F. Supp. 120, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
264 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 547 (citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96).
265 Id. at 549.
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more weight under this factor.266
In analyzing Letterese, the court used the same test as in
Warner Bros. and stated that the amount of work used must be rea-
sonable "in light of the purpose and character of the use." 267 The
court reasoned that the assessment is to be based on " 'the portion
used' . . . with respect to the 'copyrighted work as a whole,' not to
the putatively infringing work." 268 In determining "the amount and
substantiality of portion used," the court, relying on Campbell, noted
that both quality and quantity must be evaluated.269 If verbatim copy-
ing-which captures the essence of the book-is found, even if it is
small quantitatively, it may be deemed to have qualitative signific-
ance and result in favor of the plaintiff.270
The court in Letterese found that "the incorporation of the
sales drills, . . . explanations of the sales techniques," and organiza-
tional aspects of the defendants' copying may be substantial enough
to reduce the demand for plaintiffs derivative works. 27 ' Therefore,
this factor was found to favor PL&A.
D. Effect of Market Harm
The fourth factor determines "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for" the underlying works.272 To determine the ef-
fect, a court examines whether the alleged infringer's work could
have a " 'substantially adverse impact on the potential market for ...
the original.' ,273
Although the Court in Campbell analyzed all four factors of
the fair use defense, particularly relevant to the analysis of Warner
Bros. is its discussion pertaining to the fourth factor.274 The Court
stated that the harm a parody may cause the market is not actionable
under copyright, because that may be the exact goal of the parody. 275
266 id.
267 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1314 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87).
268 Id. at 1314-15.
269 Id. at 1315 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587).
270 id.
271 id
272 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4).
273 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590).
274 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
275 Id. at 591-92.
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Furthermore, the Court stated it is unlikely a plaintiff will license crit-
ical reviews; therefore, since there is no market for an author's criti-
cal reviews of her own work, this factor will tip in the defendant's fa-
vor when the alleged infringing work is merely a critical review of
the author's work.276 However, the Court went on to say that when
the case goes beyond the purpose recognized by the fair use defense,
it must look "to the other elements of the work."27 7 Since 2 Live
Crew's song was not just a parody, but also rap music, "the derivative
market for rap music is a proper. . . enquiry.,2 7 8
Similarly, in Ringgold, the court stated that if the author can
demonstrate there is a likelihood of a potential market to license her
work, the balance of this factor will weigh in her favor.279 Relying on
Nimmer on Copyright, the court in Ringgold pointed out that the
claimant is not required to prove damages in relation to her current
market, but that it may negatively impact possible sales in a future
market.280
Applying the fourth factor, the court in Warner Bros. deter-
mined that if the defendants were permitted to publish the Lexicon, it
could have an adverse impact on Rowling's future market.281 Al-
though it would not have an adverse impact on her current novels, it
could prevent fans from purchasing companion books because most
of the text would be printed in the Lexicon.282 Furthermore, the court
found that because the Lexicon would be printing plaintiffs material
without obtaining a license, plaintiff s market to license out the same
material would be weakened.283 Although the court found that the
balance of the fourth factor weighed in plaintiffs favor, it nonethe-
less did not agree with all of the plaintiff s arguments.
The court determined that even though the Lexicon would be
in direct competition with an encyclopedia that Rowling was plan-
ning on creating, it was not of consequence under the market harm
276 Id. at 592.
277 id.
278 Id. at 592-93.
279 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81.
280 Id.; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 50, §
13.05[A][4]).
281 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
282 Id. at 550.
283 Id. at 551.
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factor.284 The court, relying on Twin Peaks, stated that because the
Lexicon is not a derivative work, plaintiff can not prevent defendant
from entering that market.285 In Twin Peaks, the court held "[t]he au-
thor of 'Twin Peaks' cannot preserve for itself the entire field of pub-
lishable works that wish to cash in on the 'Twin Peaks' phenome-
non." 286 Relying on Twin Peaks, the court in Warner Bros. stated
that " 'by developing or licensing a market for parody, news report-
ing, educational or other transformative uses of its own creative
work, a copyrighted owner plainly cannot prevent others from enter-
ing those fair use markets.' "287 Similarly, the court in Ty, Inc., held
that the market harm did not weigh against a defendant who wrote an
unauthorized collector's book for items that he did not create. 288 Al-
though Warner Bros. places support of its decision on the Ty, Inc. de-
cision, it is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in Campbell. The Court stated that when the case goes beyond the
purpose recognized by the fair use defense, it must look "to the other
elements of the work."289 Since the 2 Live Crew song was not just a
parody, but also rap music, "the derivative market for rap music [was
the] proper . .. enquiry." 2 9 0
In comparing the fourth factor of the fair use analysis, Warner
Bros., as well as Ty, Inc., on which it relied, once again seems at odds
with the Campbell decision. The finding of the Warner Bros. court
that "the market for reference guides to the Harry Potter works [was]
not exclusively [Rowling's] to exploit or license, no matter the com-
mercial success attributable to the popularity of the original works,"
is simply inconsistent with the Campbell case. 291 Although the Su-
preme Court said Orbison had never entered the rap sector, it contin-
ued its analysis.292 It held that the existing market for rap music was
the proper inquiry.293 If the alleged infringement acted as a substitute
and interfered with Orbison's reasonable chance to enter that market,
284 Id. at 550.
285 id.
286 Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1377.
287 Warner Bros., F. Supp. 2d at 550 (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n. 11).
288 Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 522.
289 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592.
290 Id at 592-93.
291 Warner Bros., F. Supp. 2d at 550.
292 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593 (noting the paradoxical nature of the song).
293 id.
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directly or by licensing, then it would cause market harm.294
In both cases, Warner Bros. and Ty, Inc., the alleged infring-
ing work would have been a substitute for a work that the plaintiff
could have reasonably created or licensed. Although pure comment
on the subject may not tip the factor of market harm in favor of the
plaintiff, when coupling the text with pictures of copyrighted items,
as occurred in Ty, Inc., it could act as a substitute for a collector's
book that the copyright holder may wish to sell. In essence, the in-
fringing work would act as a substitute and the holder would lose the
advantage of his copyrighted work. Similarly, the Lexicon was not
just commentary but an encyclopedia painting pictures with Rowl-
ing's copyrighted words. If the Lexicon had entered the market, it
would act as a substitute to an encyclopedia that Rowling could have
produced, for which a market not only existed, but that Rowling had
295already expressed an intention of entering. Just as in Ty, Inc.,
Rowling would lose the advantage of her copyrighted protection and
her incentive to create would be reduced.296
Therefore, the court's determination that the Lexicon's ad-
verse impact on Rowling's own encyclopedia sales could not consti-
tute market harm under the fair use analysis is inconsistent with
Campbell. It is also inconsistent with the copyright law because it
diminishes the "important economic incentive" for the original crea-
tor.297 Even if the "overriding purpose and character is" one which is
recognized by the fair use defense, it may still cause cognizable
harm, especially if there is a large amount of copying. 298 In the
Warner Bros. case, although the purpose of the Lexicon may have
been transformative, the transformative content was slight in relation
to the quantity of the copying, and as the Court in Campbell stated, it
could cause cognizable harm.299 Hence, the Lexicon acted as a subs-
titute for a work Rowling could have licensed. Therefore, with re-
gard to the Lexicon's harming Rowling's opportunity to enter the
market for Harry Potter encyclopedias, the fourth factor should have
tipped even further in the plaintiff s favor.
294 id.
295 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
296 Id. at 552.
297 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
298 Id. at 588.
299 Id. at 591 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984)).
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In contrast to Warner Bros., the court in Letterese accurately
applied the reasoning set forth in Campbell, and stated that under the
fourth factor "the adverse effect [is] . . .primarily concerned [with]
market substitution."300 While complementary materials may be
deemed a fair use, " 'copying that is a substitute for the copyrighted
work . . . or for derivative works from the copyrighted work, is not
fair use.' "9301
The court in Letterese noted, with respect to WISE, that there
was a potential for adverse market harm because WISE captured "the
heart" of the book's expression by using "the selection and structure
of sales techniques and distinctive descriptions thereot, and] may
well usurp the potential for 'Big League Sales' and derivative
works."302 However, with regard to CSI, the court determined that
market harm would not occur.303 The court reasoned that all versions
bear the "imprimatur of Hubbard's pen . . . . [Therefore], PL&A's
derivative works would not be market substitutes for CSI's courses,
and vice versa." 304 Additionally, the court reasoned that because the
only harm that fair use is concerned with is market substitution for
derivative works, when analyzing the CSI claim, this factor strongly
favors the defendants.305 Consistent with the Campbell decision, the
court in Letterese stated that, even though no current market for Big
League Sales or for its derivative works existed, market harm may
still occur.306 The court stated that "the relevant consideration [is] the
'potential market.' "307
In contrast, the Warner Bros. court stated that "because a ref-
erence guide to the Harry Potter works is not a derivative work;
competing with Rowling's planned encyclopedia is therefore per-
missible."308 The Warner Bros. court relied on the Twin Peaks deci-
sion, which stated that " 'by developing or licensing a market for pa-
rody, news reporting, educational or other transformative uses of its
300 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1315.
301 Id. at 1315-16 n.31 (quoting Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 517).
302 Id. at 1318.
303 Id. at 1319.
3 Id. at 1318-19.
305 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1319.
306 Id. at 1317.
307 Id. (citing Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110,
1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99)).
308 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
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own creative work, a copyrighted owner plainly cannot prevent oth-
ers from entering those fair use markets.' "309 However, the Warner
Bros. court failed to mention that Twin Peaks also stated, "[i]n the
cases where we have found the fourth factor to favor a defendant, the
defendant's work filled a market niche that the plaintiff simply had
no interest in occupying." 3 10 Additionally, although the Twin Peaks
court stated that an author may not "preserve for itself the entire field
of publishable works," the court followed up the sentence by saying,
"[b]ut it may rightfully claim a favorable weighting of the fourth fair
use factor with respect to a book that . . . risk[s] impairment of the
market for the copyrighted works themselves or derivative works that
the author is entitled to license."31' In the Warner Bros. case, Rowl-
ing was planning to enter the niche of encyclopedias, and, as Rowl-
ing's expert testified, the sale of the Lexicon would impair her Harry
Potter encyclopedia sales.312 Therefore, the Warner Bros. court
should have tipped the "favorable weighting of the fourth fair use
factor" even further in the direction of the plaintiffs.313
VI. CONCLUSION
A. Were the Cases Decided Correctly?
The substantially similar test, applied by both the Eleventh
Circuit and the Second Circuit, seems to work well at determining if
two works are, indeed, substantially similar. In fact, it takes into ac-
count both fictional and fact-based works. The test analyzes the al-
leged infringing work based on the overall structure and similarities
in language; therefore, regardless of the type of text that the original
work was comprised of, the amount of substantially similar work can
be determined. The difference in the amount of weight that the court
placed on the structure in the Letterese case, as opposed to the focus
on the similarities of the text in the Warner Bros. case, is evidence of
the flexibility of the test.
309 Id. (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145 n.11).
310 Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1377.
311 Id.
312 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
313 Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1377.
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Beyond the determination of whether the works were substan-
tially similar, the two cases seemed to be analyzed quite differently.
First, the court in Warner Bros. approached the issue of whether the
infringing work constituted a derivative work differently than the
court in Letterese did. Second, each court evaluated the harm to the
market factor under fair use differently.
In discussing the derivative aspect, the Letterese Court noted
that PL&A's argument was not that it transformed but remounted,
and, therefore, the court held it did not fall under the definition of a
derivative work under § 101.314 In contrast, the plaintiffs in Warner
Bros. argued "that based on the Twin Peaks decision companion
guides constitute derivative works where, as is the case here, they
'contain a substantial amount of material from the underlying
work.' ,315 Unfortunately, as discussed above, the court in Warner
Bros. relied on Ty, Inc., which was arguably decided incorrectly, and
held that the Lexicon did not constitute a derivative work.316
In analyzing the market harm factor under the fair use de-
fense, the Letterese court correctly analyzed the market harm for fu-
ture derivatives. However, the Warner Bros. court erroneously found
that the impact of the Lexicon on Rowling's future encyclopedia sales
was irrelevant under the market harm analysis. Therefore, although
the Letterese case was decided correctly, the Warner Bros. case was
not.
B. How Should the Current Tests Change?
1. Market Harm Analysis
To resolve inconsistencies with the circuits' approaches in de-
termining the market harm factor analysis, a simple two-prong test
should be applied: first, is there a market, either current or potential,
for the defendant's alleged infringing work; second, could the alleged
infringing work act as a substitute for a work plaintiff could reasona-
bly license out or fulfill herself?
Applying this test to Warner Bros., there is not only a market
314 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1299-1300 (citing Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342).
315 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (citations omitted).
316 Id. See discussion infra Part IV.
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for encyclopedias corresponding to the Harry Potter series, but one
that Rowling had already expressed intention of entering. Next, be-
cause the Lexicon used Rowling's essence by taking her expression,
the Lexicon would be a substitute for plaintiffs work. Rowling
would lose the advantage of her copyrighted work and the two works
would be on an even ground. Therefore, applying this test, the fourth
factor would have tipped in favor of the plaintiffs, even if only a po-
tential market for Harry Potter encyclopedias existed, because it was
the copyright holder's choice to enter that market or license the right
out to another party.
2. Derivative Works Analysis
The court in Warner Bros. held that collectors' guides were
not derivative works because they did not "recast, transform, or adapt
the things to which they are guides." 3 17 However, this test only par-
tially encompasses the text of 17 U.S.C.A. § 101. Section 101 also
says, "A work consisting of . . . modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' "918
The Lexicon used Rowling's words to paint pictures, and the entire
purpose of the Lexicon was to give readers a deeper understanding of
Rowling's work; therefore, similar to a sequel, although it has addi-
tional elements beyond the original work, the Lexicon still, "as a
whole," represented Rowling's work. To limit the derivative test as
Warner Bros. did, ignores the fact that § 101 is speaking about works
"based upon [a] . . . preexisting work[]" and misses the point of why
the copyright law protects derivative works.3 19 The right was given
to authors "because the licensing of derivatives is an important eco-
nomic incentive to the creation of originals." 320 In fact, the Warner
Bros. court's rationale overlooks the scenario that occurs when two
works have been found to be substantially similar: although the in-
fringing work may not "recast, transform, or adapt the things to
which they are guides,"321 it nevertheless would not exist but for the
original work, and thus may represent the original creator's work.
" Ty, Inc., 292 F.3d at 520.
318 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
319 id
320 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
321 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
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When this occurs, a new test should be applied, which more accurate-
ly reflects the goal of copyright as articulated by the Supreme Court
in Campbell. If a finding of substantial similarity is found then a two
prong test should occur: first, determine whether the second work
captures an audience primarily due to the second author's use of the
original copyrighted material; if so, the second step should be to de-
termine if the original author would have any reasonable prospect of
licensing out the right to create a work that fills the same niche as the
alleged infringing work. If these prongs are answered in the affirma-
tive, then the work constitutes a derivative. Thus, the same analysis
used under the fourth prong of the fair use test, effect of market harm,
should be incorporated into the test for determining if a work is a de-
rivative.
Applying this new test to the Warner Bros. case would result
in a holding that the Lexicon was a derivative work. After conclud-
ing that the works were substantially similar, the next question would
be: does the second work capture an audience primarily due to the
second author's use of the original copyrighted material? This an-
swer would have to be yes. First, the encyclopedia would not exist
unless Rowling's copyrighted novels first existed. Second, the ele-
ments described in the Lexicon would not have the same advantage in
the market of one created by Rowling if it did not use her copyrighted
detailed expressions.322 The final inquiry is: could Rowling reasona-
bly expect to license this right out or use it herself? Here, there is no
room for doubt that she could have. She had already expressed her
intentions to do so. Therefore, under this test, the Lexicon would be a
derivative work.
C. Public Policy Furthered by the Tests
The central theme of copyright law is "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."323 The way the Second Circuit
is currently applying the copyright law actually hinders the constitu-
tional objective by limiting the exclusive rights granted to an author
and thereby reducing the incentive for an author to create. It may
even cause a new author to refrain from publishing. In the Warner
Bros. case, Rowling said if the Lexicon was released, she would lose
322 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
323 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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incentive to publish her own work.324 Furthermore, if it is easy for
someone to copy an author's work, instead of providing an incentive
for new original work, it can cause authors not to publish until each
possible variation of the book has been released.
At first glance, it may seem like reducing the author's control
of her derivative works would benefit the public by allowing more
works to be created. It may also seem that by broadening the fair use
analysis, more people can create works that would "promote the
Progress of ... useful Art." 325 However, by allowing anyone to sub-
stantially copy from another's work and then enter the work into the
market by simply stamping it with a transformative aspect, it would
likely promote un-useful art production. This is inconsistent with the
Court's reasoning in Campbell, which stated that when the "alleged
infringer merely . .. [uses the work] to avoid the drudgery in working
up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's
work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish)."326
Additionally, in the Campbell concurrence, Justice Kennedy
pointed out that it should not be easy for alleged infringers "to exploit
existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a valuable
commentary on the original." 327 He further noted that "underprotec-
tion of copyright disserves the goals of copyright just as much as
overprotection, by reducing the financial incentive to create." 328
Although ultimately the Second Circuit decided the Warner
Bros. case correctly, if its tests do not change, it will be easy for
copiers to enter their 'art' into the public domain. Therefore, the goal
of copyright law-to promote useful art-will not be achieved.
324 Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
325 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
326 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
327 Id. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
328 id.
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